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Abstract3
Humans invest in fantastic stories – mythologies. Recent evolutionary theories4
suggest that cultural selection may favour moralising stories that motivate proso-5
cial behaviours. A key challenge is to explain the emergence of mythologies that6
lack explicit moral exemplars or directives. Here, we resolve this puzzle with an7
evolutionary model in which arbitrary mythologies transform a collection of egoistic8
individuals into a cooperative. Importantly, in finite populations, reflecting relative9
to contemporary population sizes of hunter-gatherers, the model is robust to the10
cognitive costs in adopting fictions. This approach resolves a fundamental prob-11
lem across the human sciences by explaining the evolution of otherwise puzzling12
amoral, nonsensical, and fictional narratives as exquisitely functional coordination13
devices.14
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Introduction16
Human culture is a bewildering array of complex yet intuitively consistent, mutually17
beneficial arrangements. From reproductive divisions of labour and alloparenting to18
collective foraging, information-sharing, education, and defence, humans are cham-19
pions of cooperation. Large-scale cooperation traces to a deep ancestral past, built20
on the back of highly social hunter-gatherer modes of existence [1, 2, 3]. It has long21
been argued that moralising mythologies were a central feature of our cooperative22
adaptive complex. According to the supernatural punishment hypothesis [4, 5], natu-23
ral and cultural selection targeted beliefs in the reality of supernatural policing, leading24
to a remarkable diversity of religious belief systems. According to these scholars, the25
prevalence of religious beliefs is explained by religion’s cooperative effects. Specifi-26
cally, beliefs in supernatural enforcers promote obedience to cooperative norms [6, 7].27
A key challenge, then, is to explain the cultural persistence of a-moral, morally am-28
biguous, and anti-social mythologies.29
For example, in Māori culture, the primordial deities Rangi and Papa are con-30
nected in a loving embrace that encompasses all of reality. The world is created when31
one of their children, Tane, pushes his parents apart, thus giving rise to the separa-32
tion of the sky (Rangi) and earth (Papa). Since then the primordial couple has lived33
in longing for each other with little or no regard for their children or, for that matter,34
mortals. It is difficult to derive any clear moral from this story. Indeed, many cultural35
mythologies exhibit morally problematic features. Consider another example, in Aztec36
mythology, the feathered serpent god Quetzalcoatl is described as having set himself37
on fire the day after an intoxicating evening in which he performed sexual acts on38
his sister Quetzalpetlatl. Both the god’s incest and the self-immolation are arguably39
morally excessive for a deity. Incest avoidance does not appear to be challenging to40
motivate. What, then, explains the emergence and propagation of mythologies that41
lack explicit moral instructions? Might such mythologies promote sociality some other42
way?43
Previous theories speculate that amoral mythologies propagate from non-functional44
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cognitive preferences for the uncanny [8]. Here, we offer a mathematical model of a45
process whereby even arbitrary fictions support sociality. Our model is distinctive46
because it demonstrates how evolutionary dynamics could favour fiction not as an47
accident but for its functions.48
Cooperation threatened by risk: the Stag Hunt. To illustrate a fundamental49
evolutionary problem of cooperation, we begin, aptly, with a mythological story called50
“The stag hunt”, which clarifies how the problem of cooperation arise even when coop-51
eration is everyone’s interest [9, 10, 11, 12]. We imagine a group of hunters deciding52
whether to hunt hares or stags. Hunting a hare is possible alone, but results in a small53
payoff. Stag hunting yields a more substantial payoff but – because it requires collec-54
tive action – it is threatened by risk-avoidance. In an all-or-none scenario, if even one55
hunter seeks to avoid the risk that cooperation fails, all hunters will fail. This reasoning56
makes the default equilibrium of ubiquitous hare-hunting stable because propensities57
toward stag hunting face downward selective pressure. How can populations transit58
to cooperation (stag-hunting) under these circumstances?59
We might look to the Theory of Mind, or the capacity to represent the mental states60
of other people, for the solution. The consensus view is that the Theory of Mind was a61
critical step in achieving cooperation at scale [13]. In a stag hunt, I can represent that62
it is in your interests to coordinate, and you can do the same. However, it has long63
been observed that Theory of Mind may compromise a coordination problem with64
risk. Merely knowing that risk-avoidance threatens the success of a stag-hunt might65
inspire risk-avoidance. For example, suppose individuals would choose Stag with a66
probability of p = 0.9. Knowing this, agents with shared intentionality can reason that67
the chance of n choosing to hunt is pn  p and, being risk-averse, down-grade their68
own p accordingly. Theory of Mind allows partners to represent each other’s uncer-69
tainty. The capacity to represent uncertainty in the setting of risk threatens coordi-70
nation, even when all parties understand that coordination is in everyone’s interests71
[14, 15, 16]. Example of such coordination failures abound. During a pandemic, we72
understand that there is ample toilet paper for all. Nevertheless, we rush to the mar-73
ket, and a wrestling match ensues because we predict, correctly, that the pandemic74
3
will cue hoarding. Were we unable to represent the minds of others, no such problem75
would arise. Even successful collectives are fragile, and humans seem in need of76
reusable mechanisms to traverse from a world of risk aversion to one of cooperative77
alignment.78
Distinct from the Theory of Mind – the capacity to represent the mental states of79
others – we define “inter-subjectivity” as the capacity of multiple individuals to share80
the same subjective beliefs [17]. Inter-subjective reality then is a belief, whether ac-81
curate or not, accepted by all parties concerned. To solve a coordination problem82
that involves risk, such as a stag hunt, requires an alignment of motivations. We next83
introduce a model in which arbitrary fictions cause a form of inter-subjectivity that84
supports risky cooperation.85
Model & Results86
2.1 Traversing the dilemma87
A tribe of individuals decide to form a group to go get food. The group consists of G88
individuals, each of whom could opt to pursue a hare or the stag. If enough people are89
hunting stag, then the hunt will be successful and yield ΠS for each active participant.90
A failed hunt results in no payoff at all. All hare hunters have a fixed payoff of ΠH91
regardless of the group composition. The hare hunters payoff is, therefore, “risk-free”,92
being achievable regardless of the decisions of the other hunters.93
We label objective and alternate realities as 1 and 2 respectively, and each indi-94
vidual has a preference (belief) in favour of one or the other. Groups form, come to a95
consensus regarding reality 1 vs 2, and each member then adopts the behaviour (H96
or S) they prefer in that consensus reality. Thus we have eight types of individual to97
consider, as shown in Fig. 1. We begin in a world where everyone favours objective98
reality and is a hare hunter, hence a population consisting of type (H,H,1).99
Before setting off on a hunt, the group G arrives at a consensus reality. A sim-100




















Figure 1: The types of individuals in the world. Individuals are aware of the realities
1 the objective or 2 alternate. However they believe in only one of them. The actions
of the individuals in each reality could be H or S. Thus a focal individual (?) is defined
by (a?1, a?2, u?) where a?i is the hunting strategy of the focal individual when in reality i
and u? is the reality that the individual believes in. Following their own narratives, the
red-tinged strategies would hunt hares, and blue-tinged, stags.
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view - a dynamics of Groupthink [18]. Humans frequently depend on the percep-102
tions of others to inform themselves [19], and the notion of Groupthink captures the103
phenomenon in which a group minimises conflict by accepting a particular viewpoint104
without a critical evaluation of the decision or the alternatives. In this view, under-105
standing is a contagion [20] that allows for fast decision making without conflicts.106
Again we illustrate using a pessimistic approach, taking a random individual as the107
source of the contagion. This amounts to a pure frequency-dependent ruling to reach108
a group decision. Group formation and composition itself can be a complex process109
but as this is not our focus we assume it takes place with no assortment, via random110
draws from the population. Some other ways of reaching a consensus are discussed111
in the Supplementary Material. Charismatic leaders could impose one view of reality112
[21], or objectivity might prevail, or everyone could simply decide for themselves. A113
simple majority vote is another appealing possibility supporting normative behaviour114
[22, 23]. The evolutionary dynamics of conformist behaviour can very well feed into115
the decision making process [24].116
Upon consensus, the individuals decide on their actions conditioned on that reality,117
and the consequences of the ensuing hunt unfold in the evolutionary dynamics.118
2.2 Evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations119
In infinitely large populations, deterministic dynamics reign supreme. Tracking all the120
possible types of individuals, the dynamics of the strategy evolution proceeds in a121
seven-dimensional simplex whose vertices correspond to strategies, with intermedi-122
ate points being a mixture of different strategies.123
This simplex is projected in Fig. 2 as a two-dimensional graphic. The edges124
connect pairs of pure strategies, and the arrows denote the direction of selection125
when only those strategies are in play. Neutral dynamics exist between strategies126
that choose the same reality and the same strategy, such as (H,H,2) and (S,H,2), or127
even if they have different realities but the same strategy in both, such as (H,H,1) and128









Figure 2: Dynamics on the edges of the simplex. The dashed edges are neutrally
stable whereas the directed edges show dominance. The edges with an open circle on
them are all bi-stable (the circle marking the position of an unstable threshold as per
Fig. SI.1), hence along those edges there would be no movement once the population
is at a vertex. Once the population reaches the (H,S,2) or (S,H,1) state, it gets locked
into the stag equilibrium. Parameters are G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1.
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the corresponding Hare strategies ((S,H,2) and (H,S,1)). The population can thus130
move into the Stag state where it can again evolve neutrally. The logic behind the two131
traversals beginning at (H,H,1) is as follows: (i) The bottom path allows for the neutral132
evolution of individuals that might hunt stags in reality 2. This choice is not selected133
against because the consensus reality is always the objective one, 1, in which they134
hunt hares, and thus we have neutral drift (H,H,1)  (H,S,1). From (H,S,1) to (H,S,2)135
inter-subjectivity can break out en masse. If the group chooses reality 2 then the136
payoff is larger as they will get the stag and the belief in alternate reality 2 increases137
until it becomes the inter-subjective reality – an accepted belief. (ii) The top path is138
possible in a similar fashion where it is belief in the objective reality 1 that forms the139
stag-inducing inter-subjective reality.140
Following either path, we see that the population can go through a step in which141
the inter-subjectivity evolves (widespread belief in either the alternate reality (bottom)142
or the objective (top)) and catalyses a transition in behaviour. The dual transition is143
also evident in the future coexistence of the diversity of stag hunters, both believing144
in different realities but still trusting each other to hunt the stag. Thus while essential145
for mediating the transition, eventually the exact choice of belief becomes immaterial.146
The mechanism leading to the bypassing of the unstable equilibrium of a stag hunt147
game is similar to the scenario of the evolution of cooperation by tag-based selection148
[25]. The narratives can be interpreted as different tags which the individuals bear149
and then can choose to discriminate between partners - cooperators and defectors150
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, in our case, individuals do not discriminate based151
on the narratives they believe. The disentangling of actions and narratives in our152
case leads to extremely complex dynamics, given the complicated nature of the pay-153
off structure (see Supplementary Information (SI)). The complexity prevents us from154
analysing the interior of the seven-dimensional simplex in detail. However, progress155
is possible using a more realistic picture of the model for finite populations, together156
with analytical tools and computer simulations.157
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2.3 Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations158
Typical prehistoric communities were of small size. To analyse the dynamics of traits159
in tribes living together in countable population sizes needs different mathematics160
[26]. Assuming the population size of the tribe is N , a sample of G individuals from161
it decide to hunt. This sampling follows a hypergeometric distribution [27, 28]. Given162
the population composition, the calculation of payoffs is denoted in the Appendix.163
As before, we assume the initial population, and hence also the hunting group G164
consisting of (H,H,1) types. New strategies can arise due to mutations. From (H,H,1)165
if mutations to types such as (H,H,2) , and (H,S,1) occur, they will be hunting Hare166
in the objective reality. Thus the fitness of these types are the same in the objective167
reality and thus neutral evolution proceeds.168
In finite populations, drift allows for the strategies such as (H,S,1) and (H,S,2)169
to rise to appreciable frequencies in the population (as in [25]). However, now that170
(H,S,2) increases in frequency. In case the alternate belief is chosen as the group171
reality, the individuals who have S action as their second reality option will hunt a172
stag. If there are more than the critical number M of stag hunter in the group G, then173
the stag hunt will be successful. Given these multiple conditionals, the calculation of174
fitness becomes a complicated matter of bookkeeping. From the payoff of a strategy175
i,πi, we can calculate the fitness of the strategy as ψi = 1 + ωπi where ω is the in-176
tensity of selection. The selection intensity dictates the impact of the game on the177
fitness of a strategy. For ω = 0, all strategies are equal with fitness of 1. As the value178
of ω increases, the game has an increasing impact on fitness. In a finite population,179
the Moran process translates game success into an increase in the frequency in the180
population (Appendix). For smaller population sizes, the stochastic effects are pro-181
nounced (see SI). Given a population size, we can explore the effect of the different182
selection intensities on the evolutionary dynamics as well as the eventual abundances183
of the strategies as illustrated in Fig 3.184
Note that in the eventual distribution, mixtures of individuals believing in both re-185















































Figure 3: Abundance plots for the eight strategies in a finite population. All sim-
ulations begin with a population consisting of (H,H,1). Transient: For different selection
intensities the initial conditions are all the same - starting in a (H,H,1)population. With
a mutation rate of µ = 10−3 new strategies appear and spread in the population. Ev-
ery 20th time-step up to 1000 time-steps are plotted, from inside to outside. Full: Over
time (5 × 106 time-steps) the population reaches stationarity. Every 1000th time-step is
plotted. The final distribution of strategies (outermost layer of the circles) is collated in
the bar-chart. Bottom: The final distribution of the strategies at time-step 5 × 106 is
plotted as a stacked bar chart for the different section intensities. When selection inten-
sity ω = 0 the dynamics is neutral and all the strategies evolve to similar abundances.
When selection intensity is increased even slightly ω = 0.2 the population is made up
predominantly of stag hunters. Note that it is not necessary that all stag hunter share
the same inter-subjective reality. Parameters are N = 32, G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and
PH = 1.
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reality would be considered as irrational. However, since selection acts only via the187
action taken, the belief can spread neutrally as long as the action performed in the188
prevalent reality remains hare hunting. Thus, although shared narratives facilitate the189
transition from hare hunters to stag hunters, the narratives themselves do not nec-190
essarily fix in the population but are merely a catalyst. Even non-believers in the191
narrative end up hunting stags, because since the majority of the population is in a192
stag hunter, to hunt stags is a rational choice.193
Discussion & Conclusion194
Belief in shared narratives can enforce rules on normative behaviour leading to a195
productive society [29]. By affecting human morality [30], beliefs can result in reduced196
cheating [31] and increased pro-social behaviour [32, 6, 33, 34]. We propose that197
since establishing a social contract became possible via the capacity for generating198
fictions, the potential for subjective reasoning could come under biological and cultural199
evolution [35, 3, 36, 37, 38, 39]. Numerous verbal or computational models exist200
which extol the role of prosocial mythologies in the spread of cooperation [30, 31].201
Our model clarifies how mythologies that lack moralising features might nevertheless202
propagate as cooperative assurance mechanisms.203
As with any model, ours has its limitations. We have modelled the evolution of a204
capacity for inter-subjective belief, assuming this capacity to be a single trait. Com-205
plex modern human behaviour is a combination of multiple traits, a package [40, 7],206
the contents of which can interact in to amplify or depress cooperative outcomes.207
Linking cultural traits resulting in a cumulative cultural evolution and exploring the208
evolution of this joint ‘package’ has been recently explored using agent-based simu-209
lations [41, 42]. Additionally, we do not explain the origin of tendencies nor attempt to210
clarify debates about origins of fictional capacities [43, 44, 45]. The arguments in the211
directions of origins need to be augmented further by studies in behavioural sciences212
and cultural anthropology. Combining multiple qualities, once humans acquired the213
ability to fictionalise their experiences, this ability would also need to be heritable. Our214
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theory assumes the actions and the ability for subjective inference to be genetically215
encoded. Using gene-culture coevolution models, it might be possible to introduce a216
transmission of not only the strategies but the fictions themselves [34]. The advent of217
storytelling as a cultural trait perhaps could be coupled together with the passage of218
genes for actions. The cultural evolution of successful stories (which couple with ac-219
tions that provide a fitness advantage) could lead to a thriving society [46]. Imagining220
stories or the ability to invent fictions indeed comes with a cognitive cost. Also, the221
ability to distinguish one narrative from another involves a cost as well. Hence a cost222
of inventing and recognising narratives is paid by all individuals - the alternate reality223
believers and the objective reality believers who can discern the difference. In the SI,224
we have explored the case where only the alternate reality believers pay the cognitive225
cost. A pronounced catalyst nature of an alternate reality appears in the presence of226
costs. After enabling a transition to the stag equilibrium in finite populations, the belief227
in an alternate reality disappears, leaving the population at the social optimum.228
While we have not focused on the content of stories per se, the narratives of229
fictions in hunter-gatherer communities often focus on pro-social qualities [7, 47]. An-230
thropological and cognitive sciences have long highlighted the importance of belief231
systems in the social evolution of humans. The exact distinction between the moral-232
ising effect of mythologies versus their effects is still debated [48]. Large-scale coop-233
eration via belief in gods, money, contracts, banks has resulted in immense growth234
in arts and trade, ultimately benefiting humanity. Since we show that the content of235
the belief does not necessarily matter, post-truths, conspiracies, and ideologies can236
spread as well. Beliefs might, therefore, be viewed as selfish elements. The effect237
on the population as a whole is inconsequential; thus, superficially, the rise and fall of238
beliefs might be likened to fashion dynamics [49].239
Inter-subjective realities rule our world today. Differing from fashions; religions,240
states, nations, and companies exert enough power in the natural world to change its241
evolutionary course. Narrative beliefs about marital rituals, vaccination programmes,242
financial/government entities and money itself control the biological output of large243
swathes of populations around the globe [50, 51, 52, 53]. The importance of narra-244
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tive in economics and politics is becoming increasingly relevant [54]. Such shared245
narratives between many individuals, help us achieve cooperation on a large-scale.246
Extending our theory to include ecological dynamics would thus be a natural exten-247
sion [55, 32, 34]. Populations that reach the stag equilibrium can increase their car-248
rying capacity and competition between populations would then be important [56].249
However as evidenced from the agricultural revolution, an increase in population250
size also comes with problems, such as lower nutritional content [57], widespread251
diseases[58, 59, 60] and the further cognitive pressures for social engineering. Thus252
the benefit and costs of larger population size would need to be balanced out [61, 62].253
If the costs are too high, an evolutionary model might revert us to the hare state, a254
reduction in population size and to a hunter-gatherer community.255
We have chosen the stag hunt as a primary example of the problem of estab-256
lishing a social contract. The model establishes a tension between a secure private257
gain and an unreliable but more considerable social gain. Dynamically speaking, if a258
model affords an unstable equilibrium between these two actions, then it will be an259
appropriate candidate for posing as an appropriate problem for a social contract. We260
have considered only two different types of realities. Once the population has sur-261
mounted one social dilemma, it will reach a plateau where a co-existence between262
inter-subjective beliefs is possible. Then the process can start again with a new chal-263
lenge, thus leading to higher social gains but at the same time, accumulating several264
narratives, from personal beliefs to institutionalised systems. From hunter-gatherers265
to the stock-exchange, the amount of cooperation that we see in human communities266
is impressive in scale and achievements. By providing a mathematical model resolv-267
ing a social contract, we show that such massive advent of cooperation can emerge268
when people have shared narratives.269
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Supplementary material424
Evolutionary dynamics in an infinite population425
In total, there are eight different strategies. The strategies can be enumerated by426
the generic profile (a?1, a?2, u?) where a?i is the hunting strategy of the focal individual427
(?) when in reality i and u? is the preferred reality of the focal individual (objective or428
alternate here-on referred to simply as reality 1 and 2). The individuals in the tribe429
form a group of size G, and they need to decide which reality they choose to believe.430
Group decision For the group to decide on a choice of reality, 1 or 2, we use a
frequency-dependent process (for other methods of reality resolution, see below).





and in the reality 2 with probability 1 − f(k, u?). The number of individuals, besides431
the focal, who believe in reality 1 is denoted by k. The Kronecker delta δu? returns 1 if432
the focal individual prefers reality 1 (i.e. if u? = 1) and 0 otherwise.433
Individual action. After the group decides the reality they believe in, each individual434
in the group chooses the appropriate action. In the reality 1, the focal individual is a435
hare hunter if δa?1 return 1 and a stag hunter otherwise. A similar reasoning works for436
reality 2 (δa?2 ).437
Values of Hares and Stags. The value of hunting a Hare is denoted by PH . The total








xk1(1− x1)G−1−k(f(k, u?)δa?1 + (1− f(k, u
?))δa?2 ) (SI.2)
where x1 = xHH1 + xHS1 + xSH1 + xSS1 the sum of the frequencies of individuals438
believe in reality 1 and thus 1−x1 = xHH2+xHS2+xSH2+xSS2, the reality 2 believers.439
The value of a stag is given by PS . The focal individual is a stag hunter according440
to the Individual action section. The group composition is a key determinant of441
the stag payoff since there is a minimum number of stag hunters necessary (M ) for442
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successful stag hunt. Besides the the focal individual, k individuals believe in reality443
1 and G − 1 − k in reality 2. However we need to sort how many of these individuals444

































?)[Q(l,m, n, o, p, q, r, s)] (SI.3)
where the Iverson bracket [63] is used to test the statement Q = (l + m + n + o =
k) ∧ (p+ q + r + s = G− 1− k) with,
[Q(l,m, n, o, p, q, r, s)] =
1, if Q is true
0, otherwise.
(SI.4)
The function χ(u?) is a step function which (when χ(u? = 1)) ascertains if the focal
individual prefers reality 1 and returns the function θ(1 + n+ o+ r+ s−M) (checking
if the number of stag hunters meet the required threshold M ). If u? = 2 then the focal
individual believes in the reality 2 and χ(u?) returns θ(1 +m+ o+ q + s−M) (again
checking if the number of stag hunters meets the required threshold M ). Putting
Pcomp together with the rest of the probabilities we get the probability of successfully









?)(1− δa?1 ) + (1− f(k, u
?))(1− δa?2 )] (SI.5)
The average payoff of an individual with strategy (a?1, a?2, u?) is then given simply by,446
π(a?1 ,a?2 ,u?) = ΠH + ΠS (SI.6)
The population dynamics can then be represented by the set of replicator equations
[64],
ẋi = xi(πi − π̄) (SI.7)
for each strategy i. There are eight possible strategies and hence the dynamics447
resides in a seven-dimensional simplex.448
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Figure SI.1: Dynamics on the edge between the pure strategies (H,H, 1) and
(S,H, 1). If only a small fraction of the population plays the (H,H,1) strategy in a popu-
lation predominantly composed of (S,H,1) individuals then the group form will consists
mostly of stag hunters. While (S,H,1) individuals hunt stag it will be a stable strat-
egy. If the number of (H,H,1) individuals is above the unstable threshold then stag
hunting is not viable since the minimum number of stag hunters required for a suc-
cessful hunt will not be present but the (H,H,1) individuals thrive. Parameters are:
G = 5,M = 4, PS = 4;PH = 1.
Dynamics between pure states The eight vertices of the simplex represent the pure
strategies, homogeneous states where all individuals play the same strategy. We
study the dynamics between all the pairwise combinations of these pure states. As-
sume a population which can have only (H,H, 1) and (S,H, 1) individuals. For a
group size G = 5 with a threshold number of stag hunters required for a successful
hunt set at M = 4 a stag provide a payoff of 4 while a hare is worth 1. Using these
values the average payoff of a (H,H, 1) strategist is simply πHH1 = (xHH1 + xSH1)4.










Plotting the replicator equation for a population of just these two types gives us449
Figure SI.1. In this manner we can describe the dynamics between all the eight450
vertices, as shown in the main text.451
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Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations452
We assume a finite population of size N . From this population we choose individuals453
to form a group of size G. If the number of individuals with strategy j is given by ij454
encapsulated in the vector i, then the average payoff of a strategy (a?1, a?2, u?) is given455
by,456














) (f(k, u?)δa?1 + (1− f(k, u?))δa?2 ) (SI.9)
PSPcomp(k, u











































) χ(u?)[Q(l,m, n, o, p, q, r, s)]
(SI.10)
again with Q as defined in Eq. (SI.4). With this approach we can calculate the av-457
erage payoff of each strategy when playing with another strategy. However for finite458
populations, we convert the payoff πi of a strategy i to its fitness ψi via a mapping of459
the form ψi = 1 + ωπi where i encompasses the strategies encoded by (a?1, a?2, u?).460
Such a combination with ω allows us to tune the impact of the game on the fitness461
[65]. If ω the selection intensity is very low ω → 0 then the strategies are neutral with462
respect to each other. Evolutionary dynamics would then be a random walk between463
the eight strategies. On the other hand for ω → 1 the game completely determines464
the difference between the strategy fitness. All of this definitely assumes that the465
strategies do not go extinct, i.e. the mutation probability is non-zero µ > 0.466
Assuming small mutation rates µ→ 0, the dynamics typically takes place between
two strategies only. Hence a pairwise comparison of the fitnesses of the strategies
proves to be instructive. The fitness of a strategy i playing against strategy j is given
by ψi,j This allows us to calculate the fixation probability of a single strategy i player
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Collating the fixation probabilities between all pairwise combinations provides us with





column ρ1,2 ρ1,3 ρ1,4 ρ1,5 ρ1,6 ρ1,7 ρ1,8
ρ2,1 1−
∑
column ρ2,3 ρ2,4 ρ2,5 ρ2,6 ρ2,7 ρ2,8
ρ3,1 ρ3,2 1−
∑
column ρ3,4 ρ3,5 ρ3,6 ρ3,7 ρ3,8
ρ4,1 ρ4,2 ρ4,3 1−
∑
column ρ4,5 ρ4,6 ρ4,7 ρ4,8
ρ5,1 ρ5,2 ρ5,3 ρ5,4 1−
∑
column ρ5,6 ρ5,7 ρ5,8
ρ6,1 ρ6,2 ρ6,3 ρ6,4 ρ6,5 1−
∑
column ρ6,7 ρ6,8
ρ7,1 ρ7,2 ρ7,3 ρ7,4 ρ7,5 ρ7,6 1−
∑
column ρ7,8





The normalised right eigenvector of A corresponding to the largest eigenvalue (which467
is 1) provides the stationary distribution of the system [66]. This analytical result is468
plotted as full lines in Figure SI.2 for a given choice of parameters.469
Alternative decision making rules470
We have assumed that the hunting party decides the choice of reality, and hence471
the ensuing actions of the involved individuals via a frequency dependent process472
(Eq. (SI.1)). In this section describe the dynamics and the eventual distribution of the473
strategies when the group uses alternative methods for reality consensus forming.474
Fixed probability of realising a reality475
Instead if the group instead decides the choice of reality with a fixed probability then476
the outcome of such a process is qualitatively different than the one discussed in the477
main text. For a fixed value of 0.5 we show the dynamics for infinitely large populations478
in Fig. SI.4479
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Believe in reality 1 Believe in reality 2
Figure SI.2: Average abundance in the long run. In the long run the strategies in
the population stabilise at the proportions which can be calculated analytically (lines)
and the results supported by individual based simulations (symbols). For a population
of size 16, and a small mutation probability of µ = 10−3, the average abundance of
the eight different strategies is denoted above for a variety of selection intensities (after
2 × 109 time-steps). The fitness of each type i is given by ψi = 1 + ωπi, where ω is
the selection intensity. For ω = 0 selection is neutral and all strategies exist in equal
proportions (1/8th = 0.125). As selection increases, we see the prevalence of the stag
hunters in the population, irrespective of their belief. Parameters are N = 16, G = 5,
M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1.
Majority vote480
Whereas the frequency dependent nature of decision making introduces a level of481
stochasticity in the system, a majority vote removes the ambiguity. If the number of482
objective reality, 1, believers form a majority, i.e. k + δu? > G/2 then we assume that483
the group decides on the inter-subjective reality to be reality 1 (and 2 otherwise).484
Majority vote is denoted by a modification of the group decision function to:
f(k, ustar) =
1, if k + δu? > G/2
0, otherwise.
(SI.13)
For a given parameter set the resulting deterministic dynamics between the pure485
states are shown in Fig. SI.5. Interestingly we see a feedback to the all hare states486
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Figure SI.3: Equilibrium abundance across population sizes. For increasing popu-
lation size, the effect of drift gets diluted and the deterministic equilibrium of the system
emerges, which is composed of individuals hunting stags. Simulation parameters be-
sides the changing population size are ω = 0.4, G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1
with µ = 10−3. The system status is reported after 5× 106 time-steps.
from the jump states of (H,S,1)and (S,H,2). In the long run however, the population487
will escape this cycling and end up in the stag hunting state as seen in Fig. SI.6.488
Costly beliefs489
If the secondary belief, the subjective reality is cognitively costly, the individual who490
prefer 2 would pay a cognitive cost. As the cost increases indeed the alternative491
belief will be harder to fix in the population. However the alternative belief still acts492
as a catalyst Fig. SI.7. It appears in a finite population by chance but spreads as it493
is still better to hunt stags than hares. However when everyone is hunting stags, the494
cognitive cost of maintaining the belief reduces the frequency of the believers. For495
increasing costs clearly the belief declines however the population is left transformed496









Group reality chosen with a 
fixed probability 0.5
Figure SI.4: Deterministic dynamics for a fixed group decision. Instead of a
frequency-dependent process as in Eq. (SI.1), if the reality is decided as 1 with probabil-
ity 0.5 then the eventual outcome is as shown in the figure. We do not show the links in
the interior as all of them consist of an unstable equilibrium and are hence impassable.
A population starting at (H,H,1) will be stuck in the hare equilibrium (H,H,?). The ap-
pearance of the unstable fixed points along the edges lock the population in pure hare
or pure stag states. Parameters used here are, G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1 with
the function f(k, u?) = 0.5. Qualitatively similar dynamics are obtained for other fixed
values of f(k, u?).
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Figure SI.5: Deterministic dynamics for a majority vote decision. Instead of a
frequency-dependent process as in Eq. (SI.1), the group reality is chosen by a majority
vote. The group reality is then the one which more than G/2 members prefer. In this
case we see the appearance of a loop where (S,H,2)and (S,H,1)can lead back to the
all hare hunters. However, in the long run, stag hunting in the ultimate sink for the
dynamics. Parameters used here are, G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1 with the
function f(k, ustar) returns the choses reality if the majority believes in it.
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Figure SI.6: Average abundance in the long run under voting. In the long run
the strategies in the population stabilise at the proportions which can be calculated
analytically (lines) and the results supported by individual based simulations (symbols).
For a population of size 16, and a small mutation probability of µ = 10−3, the average
abundance of the eight different strategies is denoted above for a variety of selection
intensities (after 2×109 time-steps). The fitness of each type i is given by ψi = 1+ωπi,
where ω is the selection intensity. For ω = 0 selection is neutral and all strategies exist
in equal proportions (1/8th = 0.125). As selection increases, we see the prevalence of
the stag hunters in the population, irrespective of their belief. Parameters are N = 16,
G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1.
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0 5 x 105
Time
5 x 106
Figure SI.7: Costly beliefs. Even if the preference for the alternative belief accrues
a cognitive cost, we show that it helps transform the population into a social group
where everyone prefers to hunt stags. The alternative belief acts as a stepping stone
(highlighted in the transients on the left by the circles), where the belief in 2 enables the
spread of stag hunter who believe in 1. Thus acting as a true catalyst, the belief helps
transform the population and then disappears. The dynamics of the eight strategies
for different levels of cognitive costs is shown for a finite population of size 32, and a
small mutation probability of µ = 10−3. The equilibrium average abundance of the eight
different strategies, which can be calculated analytically is is shown in the right panel for
a variety of cognitive costs (after 5×106 time-steps). As selection increases, we see the
prevalence of the stag hunters in the population, irrespective of their belief. Parameters
are N = 16, G = 5, M = 4, PS = 4 and PH = 1. The selection intensity is set to
ω = 0.5.
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